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Risk Preferences as Determinants of Soil Conservation Decisions           
in Ethiopia 
Hailemariam Teklewold and Gunnar Köhlin 
Abstract 
Soil degradation is one of the most serious environmental problems in the highlands of 
Ethiopia. The prevalence of traditional agricultural land use and the absence of appropriate resource 
management often result in the degradation of natural soil fertility. This has important implications for 
soil productivity, household food security, and poverty. Given the extreme vulnerability of farmers in 
this area, we hypothesized that farmers’ risk preferences might affect the sustainability of resource use. 
This study presents experimental results on the willingness of farmers to take risks and relates the 
subjective risk preferences to actual soil conservation decisions. The study looks at a random sample of 
143 households with 597 farming plots. We found that a high degree of risk aversion significantly 
decreases the probability of adopting soil conservation. This implies that reducing farmers’ risk 
exposure could promote soil conservation practices and thus more sustainable natural resource 
management. This might be achieved by improving tenure security, promoting access to extension 
services and education, and developing off-farm activities that generate income. 
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Risk Preferences as Determinants of Soil Conservation Decisions     
in Ethiopia 
Hailemariam Teklewold and Gunnar Köhlin∗ 
Introduction 
The Ethiopian highlands cover 40 percent of Ethiopia’s land mass, but account for about 
95 percent of all cultivated land. Almost 88 percent of its human population lives there, with 70 
percent of the total livestock population of the country (Ayele 1999). It is estimated that over 90 
percent of the economic activities in Ethiopia are concentrated in the highlands. Sustainable use 
of land in these areas is fraught with problems due to continuous cropping and repeated 
cultivation of sloping lands without proper consideration for soil conservation and fertility 
amendments. Soil resources are eroding at an alarming rate, but as yet there is insufficient 
awareness, both within and outside the farming community, of the sources of the problems. Now, 
even the more productive areas in Ethiopia are facing high rates of soil erosion.  
Soil erosion—averaging 4.2 tons of soil loss per hectare per year—is a huge contributor 
to the low productivity of Ethiopian soils (Hurni 1993). As a result, soil erosion puts some 
20,000–30,000 hectares of croplands out of use annually (Bewket 2007; FAO 1986). The Soil 
Conservation Research Project (Hurni 1993) estimated the effect of soil erosion on crop 
productivity for the major crops, using a production function based on time-series data. In this 
study, a loss of 1 centimeter of soil depth (about 100 tons per hectare of soil) was estimated to 
reduce about 2 percent and 4.5 percent of the production of wheat in vertisols (black, fissured 
soil) and red upland soil (clayey loam), respectively. As in other sub-Saharan African countries 
(Sanchez et al. 1996), depletion of the soil fertility of small Ethiopian farm plots is the 
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fundamental biophysical limiting factor responsible for the declining per capita food production 
(Elias and Scoones 1999). In view of this, soil erosion and soil depletion constitute a national 
hazard, whose containment is a prerequisite for national development, particularly in a society 
that is agriculture based.  
The traditional explanations for soil degradation relate to resource depletion and land 
mismanagement associated with limited soil conservation practices. Generally, the objectives of 
soil conservation are prevention of soil loss and management of soil fertility. Sheng (1989) 
defined soil conservation as a conscious process for the use and protection of land, including 
wise land use, necessary soil management, and erosion control. Some studies on the economics 
of soil conservation in developing countries have suggested incentives for farmers to adopt soil 
conservation by analyzing their household characteristics and the features and attributes of their 
farm operations (Thao 2001; Ervin and Ervin 1982; Saliba and Bromley 1986; Soule et al. 2000; 
Gebremedhin and Scott 2003). Generally, land tenure arrangements, soil characteristics, input 
and output prices, availability of off-farm employment, farm size, household size, discount rates, 
and government policies influence the use of (or refusal to use) soil conservation measures by 
farmers in developing countries.  
Rarely, however, has the influence of risk aversion for adoption of soil conservation 
practices been addressed, and strong empirical evidence to test its importance and impact has 
been scarce and scattered. Feder et al. (1985), in their review of the conservation adoption 
literature, attributed this scarcity to difficulties in observing and measuring risk and uncertainty. 
Farmers are unlikely to invest in soil conservation unless they can see the benefits of soil erosion 
control. In practice, the major benefit that a farmer receives from soil conservation is the soil 
itself—a potential asset for future income. The stock of soil available to a farmer is essentially an 
economic asset that can be exploited through cultivation to yield a stream of present and future 
income (Barbier 1990). Often, the return for practicing soil conservation can be long in coming, 
a feature that helps explain low adoption rates (Shively 1997). However, delays in payback do 
not completely explain low rates of investment, even if subjective discount rates are high. In 
many cases, practical strategies to reduce soil erosion introduce economic risks that reduce their 
potential value. Although several empirical studies have shown that the assumptions of risk 
neutrality can overestimate the value of soil conservation (e.g., Ndiaye and Sofranko 1994), such 
assumption remains pervasive in studies of soil conservation adoption and performance.  
Considering the importance of risk, Binswanger et al. (1980) validated that a portion of 
the observed variation among individual farmers’ agricultural decisions can be related to 
variations in the same farmers’ degrees of risk aversion (as measured in experiments), where the Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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more risk averse choose more conservative options. Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009) also indicated 
that, in countries where poverty and environmental degradation are intertwined, and credit and 
insurance markets are imperfect or completely absent, the critical factors affecting sustainability 
of resource use are the extent to which people discount the future and their willingness to 
undertake risky activities, such as investment decisions. Dillon and Scandizzo (1978) and 
Binswanger (1980) mentioned that poor people are risk averse and their production and 
investment decisions are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and inefficiency, which in 
turn affects sustainable use of their resources.  
Our study, therefore, intends to measure the degree of risk preference of smallholder 
farmers and empirically examine the effects of farmers’ risk preferences (plus other 
socioeconomic factors) on soil conservation decisions at the farm level. The importance of this 
study lies in identifying ways to enhance soil conservation practices and to assist policymakers in 
promoting appropriate soil conservation strategies. We tested two main researchable hypotheses:  
1) that farmers with high-risk aversion behavior exist in the study area, and 2) that the 
probability of a farm households’ soil conservation decision is negatively affected by a high 
degree of risk aversion. In addition, we expected that the choice of conservation system would be 
influenced by a number of factors, namely, farmers’ attributes (level of education, farming 
experience, labor availability, wealth status, and social capital), farm characteristics (soil types, 
soil fertility, slope, plot size, and distance of plot from house), and policy-related variables 
(extension services, use of radio, market access, off-farm work, and land tenure security).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
economics of soil conservation. Section 2 explains the econometric approach. Theoretical 
background and experimental design for risk preference are presented in section 3. This is 
followed by section 4, with a brief description of the study area, sampling, and data collection 
procedures. Section 5 discusses the empirical results of the analyses of farmers’ risk preferences 
and soil conservation decision, and regression results. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
1. Economic Model for Soil Conservation 
There are a range of approaches applied in the analysis of soil conservation ranging from 
quantification of the national impacts of soil loss to the identification of factors that influence 
farmers’ soil management decisions. The model used in this paper is an adaptation of Barbier’s 
(1990) economic model of the soil-conservation investment decision of farmers in developing 
countries. The model posits price-taking producers who choose to install and maintain 
conservation practices in order to maximize the net present value of output. In our study, we Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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extended the Barbier (1990) model to include farmers’ risk preferences and other socioeconomic 
characteristics as factors influencing the adoption decision. 
Let  f(xt,st) be a vector of outputs produced at time t, where xt is a vector of production 
inputs used at time t, and st denotes soil stock at time t. Consider a farm household that produces 
farm output in each period using a depletable input, st, and production inputs, xt. Soil dynamics, 
dt ds , is represented by the soil quality retained by the investment in soil conservation, I(kt, θt, 
ht), and loss of soil from inputs used in agricultural production, xt. Investment in soil 
conservation, in turn, is a function of the stock of soil conservation structures (kt) and other 
factors, such as farmers’ risk preferences (θt,) and socioeconomic characteristics (ht). Let pt, wt, 
and ct be the respective price vectors corresponding to output, input, and soil conservation, 
respectively. The net present value of a stream of output is defined as the accumulated crop 
revenue less the cost of production inputs and the cost of soil conservation investment discounted 
by the discount rate (δ). Thus, the farmer’s objective function is to maximize the net present 
value of profit from agricultural production (subscripts are suppressed), given by:   
 
{}
() [] () T
k x,
s V dt ck wx s x, pf
δt δt e e −
=
− + − − = Π ∫
T
0 t
Max ,   (1) 
and subject to: 
() x h , θ , k I t t t − = dt
ds  ,    (2) 
where V(sT) is the scrap value. 
The first step in the optimization is the construction of the Hamiltonian in equation (3). 
The right-hand side of the equation of motion (2) is multiplied by the costate variable λt and 
appended to the objective function in equation (1): 
() [] ( ) ( ) x h , θ , k I ck wx s x, pf t t t − λ + − − = −
δt e
H     (3) 
The costate variable λ represents the shadow or implicit price of the equation of motion 
or the shadow price of the soil stock in time t. The amount of soil stock used (the right-hand side 
of the motion equation [2]) multiplied by the implicit price of the soil stock gives the shadow 
value of soil capital (or the dynamic cost to future generations using the soil). The optimal level 
of soil conservation investment can be determined by differentiating equation (3) with respect to 
k: Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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By rearranging equation (4), the condition  h)) θ, (k, (I λ k =
δ − c e
t implies that optimal soil 
conservation investment takes place at the level where the present value of the additional income 
derived from soil conservation equals the discounted additional cost of soil conservation. 
Alternatively, the optimal level of soil conservation can be determined as the level at which the 
additional user cost of soil erosion avoided just equals the discounted additional cost of soil 
conservation. 







∂ 0 x) (s,   s
f , but also depends on other production factors. One of the features of this type 
of model is that stock of soil can be enhanced by investment in soil conservation ( ) 0 I   ∂
∂s . In 
turn, risk aversion is related to soil stock through investment in soil conservation structures, 
implying that soil conservation investment decreases with the farmer’s risk preferences 
( ) 0 ≺ θ ∂
∂I . The more risk-averse farmers may be reluctant to sacrifice short-term returns for less 
certain long-term benefits of conservation practices.  
2.  Econometric Approach:  Analysis of Soil Conservation Decision 
Most adoption studies treat the use of soil conservation measures as a discrete all-or-
nothing adoption decision of a single practice. From a policy perspective, such studies do not 
supply information on how multiple practices can fit together into an overall conservation 
package. Adopting multiple soil conservation practices is common in Ethiopia because 
topography and soils frequently vary substantially within farms and because farmers usually 
diversify crop and livestock production. For a given plot of land, a farmer is assumed to have 
preferences over a discrete set of alternative soil conservation systems—a choice problem that 
requires application of multinomial discrete choice models.    
A multinomial logit model of a qualitative response variable characterizes a choice from 
discrete (nominal) alternatives by a decisionmaker as a function of attributes associated with 
each alternative, as well as the characteristics of the individual. Because of its analytical and 
computational tractability, this model has been applied extensively to discrete choice processes 
in economics with great success (Manski and McFadden 1981; Train 2003). A certain soil 
conservation system is chosen for a given plot, if and only if the expected utility from the 
selected option is greater than the utility obtainable from other available alternatives. Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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Consider the utility of farmer n adopting soil conservation practice choice j on the plot 
Unj. The systematic component of the utility of alternative j is specified as a function of an array 
of household (H), farm (F), and regional (R) characteristics. Hence, 
Unj = αjHn + ΦjFn + φjRn + εnj   . 
Assuming the errors εnj are independently and identically distributed with an extreme 
value distribution, the probability that alternative j is chosen from J alternative sets can be 
represented by the multinomial logit model (MNL) function (McFadden 1974; Train 2003). The 
general form of the MNL is: 
() ( )





n j n j n j
n j n j n j
j
nj Z j β
nj Z j β
R F Φ H α exp
R F Φ H α exp
e
e
J j choice Prob ,   
where n = 1  . . . N indexes the observation and j = 1 . . . J indexes the choices.  
The dependent variable is Y, coded as 0, 1, 2 (alternative soil conservation systems); Zn is 
the explanatory vector (representing age, sex, education, extension contact, availability of family 
labor, risk attitude, time preference, plot size, soil type, slope, wealth and credit, etc). In order to 
identify unique coefficients for the alternatives, one of the outcomes in the multinomial logit 
model must be normalized to zero. 
Even if the coefficient estimates have different interpretations depending on the omitted 
category, the probabilities remain the same. Alternatively, the coefficients can be used to 
calculate the partial changes in probabilities (marginal effect). The marginal effects measure the 
expected change in probability of the choice being made with respect to a unit change in an 
explanatory variable (Greene 2008). When there are J = 3 number of soil conservation choices, 
the marginal change in probability of a given soil conservation system, given the change in 






















The marginal effect of a dummy variable on the event probability can always be 
accurately derived by taking the difference between the predicted probability when the variable 
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∆Prob (Y = j) = Prob (Y = j|Z, Zk = Z1) – Prob (Y = j|Z, Zk, = Z0). 
Summing the marginal probabilities across the three soil conservation alternatives for a 
unit change of a given explanatory variable gives zero sums, implying that an increase in the 
adoption rate of the given choice due to a change in a particular characteristics variable is 
compensated by a decrease in the adoption rate of other choices in the set. 
3.  Experimental Design:  Risk Preference 
The expected utility theory, developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (N-M) in 1944, 
is of central importance in describing decisionmaking under risk. Decision under uncertainty, as 
described by the N-M model, defines the utility to be maximized as the expectation of the 
utilities of the random alternatives. The concept of lottery as a formal device to represent risky 
alternatives is the basic building block for the N-M expected utility theory. A simple lottery is a 
list, L = (P1,…, PN); Pn > 0 for all n; and ∑n Pn = 1, where Pn is the probability of outcome n 
occurring. The concept of “risk aversion” intuitively implies that, when facing choices with 
comparable returns, agents tend to choose the less-risky alternative—a construction we owe 
largely to Friedman and Savage (1948). To put it differently, an agent is risk averse if replacing 
an uncertain final wealth by its expected value makes the agent better off.  
In our study, which follows Binswanger’s (1980) framework, the experimental method 
through predetermined choices approach was employed to elicit farmers’ risk preferences by 
observing the reactions of farmers to a set of actual gambles in one period. In a real context, 
respondents were presented with certain realistic lotteries of the form (q
max, q
min, P), promising a 
monetary prize for q
max with probability P, or q
min with probability (1 – P). The lotteries 
represent different real farming conditions and were designed with six different payoff levels, 
given a 50 percent probability of bad or good harvesting conditions (see table 1 below). 
Following the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility approach, an important ingredient is 
the specification of the utility function. The most popular parameter specification is the constant 
partial risk-aversion (CPRA) function, where the utility function is characterized by the risk-
aversion parameter θ. Thus, a CPRA function as an approximation of [ ]
θ θ
− − =
1 ) 1 ( M U  is used in 
order to measure and obtain a unique risk-aversion coefficient, where θ is the coefficient of risk 
aversion and M is the certainty equivalent of the prospect. The upper and lower limits of θ are 
given in table 1. 
The participants in the household survey were confronted with two experiments:  one 
involved hypothetical trade-offs and the other the possibility of real payoffs. In the real payment Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
8 
experiment, the average payoffs for the household in the experiment was ETB 25,1 which was 
approximately five times the daily wage level of the unskilled laborers in the study area. Table 1 
explains the basic structure. The sample farmers were presented with a choice of six alternatives.  
Once the farmers selected one of the alternatives, they had a 50 percent probability of getting 
either the bad harvest or good harvest payoffs. The experiment consisted of offering farmers a set 
of alternatives where higher expected gain could only be obtained at the cost of higher 
variance—thus a decline in risk aversion. 





















6  10.00  10.00  10.00  0.00  0.78–1.00  ∞  to 7.47  Extreme 
5 9.00  18.00  13.50 4.50  0.71–0.78 7.47–1.74  Severe 
4  8.00  24.00  16.00  8.00  0.50–0.71  1.74–0.81  Intermediate 
3 6.00  30.00  18.00  12.00  0.33–0.50 0.81–0.32  Moderate 
2  2.00  38.00  20.00  18.00  0.00–0.33  0.32–0.00  Slight 
1 0.00  40.00  20.00  20.00  -∞  to 0.00  0.00 to -∞   Neutral 
* ETB = Ethiopian birr. US$ 1 = ETB 11.  
** Z is the tradeoff between expected gains and standard deviations of two games ( dSE
dE Z = ) 
Basically individuals are assumed to be risk averse in cases where a certain outcome with 
a lower payoff is preferred over an uncertain outcome with a higher expected payoff. In contrast, 
risk-seeking behavior occurs when individuals consistently choose a gamble over a certain 
payoff with a higher payoff value. For instance, choice 1 is a safe alternative where subjects 
could earn ETB 10, with either a bad or good outcome. In alternative 5, a coin was tossed and the 
subject received ETB 2 if the coin showed heads and ETB 38 if the coin showed tails. Compared 
to choice 1, the individual’s expected gain now increased by ETB 10, but if heads (bad outcome) 
turned up, it would reduce the return by ETB 8. In the meantime, the standard deviation in gain 
is increased from ETB 0 to ETB 18. Hence, with such uncertainty in gains, these choices involve 
more risk than the previous choices (that is, choices 1 to 4). 
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4.  Study Areas and Data 
The data in this study were derived from a formal survey of a random sample of farm 
households, December 2003–January 2004. The areas selected for this study, Ankober and 
Basona-Werena districts, are located within the North Shewa zone, in the Amhara Regional State 
of Ethiopia. North Shewa is a major agricultural region in the central highlands of Ethiopia, with 
a rugged, mountainous terrain, where altitudes range from 1,600 to 3,500 meters above sea level. 
The area has two periods of rainfall, averaging 900–1,740 mm; the main rainy season (Meher) 
runs from July to September and the short rainy season (Belg) is from January to April. The 
concentration of rain in heavy showers, coupled with an undulating landscape, causes significant 
erosion throughout the area. 
A two-stage cluster sampling technique was employed to randomly select one village 
from each district and households from each village. The list of 29 villages in Basona-Werena 
district and 18 villages in Ankober district served as the sampling frame for the choice of the two 
villages, while households within each village were the sampling units. The sample households 
were randomly selected from the villages using lists that exhaustively record all members of the 
two villages.  
A structured questionnaire was prepared and the sampled respondents were interviewed. 
Initial pre-survey tests were made in the selected villages to verify the feasibility of the study and 
allow redesign of the questionnaire if needed. In the randomly selected farm households, the 
head of the household was surveyed personally by experienced interviewers under close 
supervision by one of the authors. The enumerators also had special training to make sure they 
understood each question and the reason for the information captured in the survey. The 
respondents were interviewed in their local language, Amharic. As a result of the careful 
preparations, there were no rejections of the central questions in the survey by the respondents 
and we are confident that the data is of unusually high quality. Information was also collected 
from discussions with other key actors (e.g., field extension agents and soil conservation 
experts). 
The survey included a total of 143 farm households with 597 farming plots and gathered 
information on the farmers’ socioeconomic characteristics (such as age, household size, 
educational level, land-holding status, extension contact, availability of credit, availability of 
modern farm inputs, community participation, social organization, transportation cost, etc.) and 
farm characteristics (plot size, number of plots, soil fertility, slope of each plot, soil type, 
distance of plot from the house, cultivation arrangements, etc.). For identification purposes, the Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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interviewers sketched all the plots farmed by the respondent and then collected detailed 
information for each plot, referring to the sketch as needed. The survey also elicited information 
from farmers regarding their risk preferences using the experiment mentioned above. 
5.  Empirical Results 
We found that indigenous soil conservation techniques were considered part of the 
farming system in the study areas. Indeed, in both areas, most farmers were familiar with 
traditional land improvement–conservation techniques, such as stone terraces and soil bunds. 
These are embankments of stone or soil constructed along the contour of the land to control the 
surface water runoff down the slope. The two soil conservation structures require different 
investments in amount of time and labor and have different effectiveness against erosion 
(Gebremedhin and Scott 2003). In Basona-Werena and Ankober districts, about 27 percent and 
38 percent of the plots, respectively, have stone terraces. However, no more than 16 to 18 
percent of the plots in both areas have soil bunds. In Ankober, soil conservation structures have 
traditionally been constructed by the farmers themselves. A majority of the farmers in Ankober 
are aware of the need for a continuing increment of soil conservation practices and have 
perceived a subsequent decline in soil erosion. However, in Basona-Werena, the government has 
instead implemented a huge food-for-work program since the 1980s, specifically to build soil 
conservation structures throughout the district.  
5.1  Farmers’ Risk Preference  
The farmers’ responses regarding risk preferences corresponding to the real and 
hypothetical experiments are presented in table 2. The results reveal that, in both the hypothetical 
and the real payoff experiments, a majority of farmers fall into the intermediate, severe, and 
extreme risk-aversion categories. In both experiments, 73 to 75 percent of the farmers in Basona-
Werena and 60 to 63 percent of farmers in Ankober preferred the alternatives representing 
intermediate to extreme risk-aversion. This result is slightly higher than Yesuf and Bluffstone 
(2009), who found that about 50 percent of farm households in the Ethiopian highlands chose the 
intermediate to extreme risk-aversion alternatives. The distribution of risk preferences in other, 
similar studies in developing countries, such as Binswanger (1980) in India and Wik et al. (2004) 
in Zambia, is quite different than our result. About 83 percent of farmers in India and 52 percent 
of farmers in Zambia fell into the intermediate-to-moderate risk category, while only 32 percent 
of farmers in our study are in this group. Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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It is generally acknowledged that experiments conducted without real payment options 
may suffer from hypothetical bias. In order to avoid such a problem and provide enough 
incentive for the farmers to reveal their true preferences, our experiment included a real payoff. 
However, comparison of the responses of the hypothetical and real experiments indicated that 
most of the respondents consistently maintained similar responses in both parts of the 
experiment. However, we saw a positive and significant correlation of responses in the risk 
aversion elicited with both hypothetical and real payoffs, contrary to what Wik et al. (2004) 
found.  
Table 2. Frequencies of Farmers' Responses to Risk Preferences 
  Risk-aversion 
category 
Basona-Werena Ankober  Total 













































Extreme  29.6  29.6  35.7  35.7  32.6  32.6 
Severe 19.7  49.3  17.1  52.8  18.4  51.0 
Intermediate  25.4  74.7  7.1  59.9  16.3  67.3 
Moderate 9.9 84.6  21.4 81.3 15.6 82.9 
Slight  8.5  93.1  7.1  88.4  7.8  90.7 




































  Extreme  31.0  31.0  32.9  32.9  31.9  31.9 
Severe 21.1  52.1  21.4  54.3  21.3  53.2 
Intermediate  21.1  73.2  8.6  63.1  14.9  68.1 
Moderate 12.7 85.9 21.4 84.5 17.0 85.1 
Slight  2.8  88.7  5.7  90.2  4.3  89.4 
Neutral 11.3  100.0  10.0 100.0 10.6 100.0 
5.2  Soil Conservation Decision 
The major observed soil-conservation practices were stone terraces and soil bunds 
constructed by the farmers themselves. The decision to build soil conservation structures 
depends upon a wide variety of factors, many of which are specific to a particular area, 
household, or plot characteristic. The explanatory variables for this decision included in our 
analysis are based on the theory discussed above and the literature on conservation investment. 
Hypothesized effects of household, plot, and regional characteristics on choice of soil 
conservation practices are included in table 3.  Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Multinomial Logit Model Variables 
Variable  Variable definition  Mean  Std. dev.   Min.     Max.  Effects 
Dependent variables         
  Stone terrace  Has stone terracing (1 = yes)  0.25 -  0.00  1.00   
  Soil bund  Has soil bunds (1 = yes)  0.13 -  0.00  1.00   
Household characteristics      
  Sex  Sex of household head (1 = male)  0.91 -  0.00  1.00  +/- 
  Age  Age of household head (in years)  45.76 13.10 19.00 84.00  + 
  Literacy  Education of household head (1 = 
able to read and write)  0.56 -  0.00  1.00  + 
  Labor  Labor force (human equivalent) 2.65 1.16 0.50  6.90  + 
  Extension  Contact extension agent (1 = yes)  0.46 -  0.00  1.00  + 
  Radio  Has a radio (1 = yes)  0.10 -  0.00  1.00  + 
  Off-farm  Off-farm work (1 = yes)  0.39 -  0.00  1.00  +/- 
  Oxen ownership  Household owns oxen (1 =  more 
than one ox)  0.69 - 0.00  1.00  + 
  Income  Net income (in ETB)  71.50 657.76 1933.0  2989.0  + 
 Land  holding 
trends 
Decline/increase in land holdings (1
= decline)  0.90 - 0.00  1.00  - 
  Risk preference  Risk-aversion coefficient  3.14 2.89 0.00  7.50  - 
  Time preference  Farmers' discount rate  89.61 36.39 12.91  186.04  - 
Plot characteristics      
  Parcel  Number of plots  5.40 2.73 1.00  15.00  - 
  Plot size  Plot size, timad* per plot  1.00 0.62 0.13  4.00  - 
  Tenure  Tenure arrangements (1 = owner 
operated)  0.93 -  0.00  1.00  + 
  Highly fertile soil  Fertility of soil  (1 = highly fertile)  0.23 -  0.00  1.00  + 
  Medium fertile   
soil  Fertility of soil (1 = medium fertile)  0.33 -  0.00  1.00  + 
  Soil type  Soil type (1 = vertisol)  0.50 -  0.00  1.00  + 
  Gentle slope  Plot has gentle slope (1 = gentle 
slope)  0.27 -  0.00  1.00  + 
  Steep slope  Plot has steep slope (1 = steep 
slope)  0.39 - 0.00  1.00  + 
  Plot distance  Distance of plot from home (in  18.01 17.11 1.00  90.00  - Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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minutes walking) 
  Plot use  Plot use (1 = crop)  0.53 -  0.00  1.00  + 
Regional characteristics      
  District  District (1 = Basona-Werena)  0.50 -  0.00  1.00  +/- 
  Road distance  Distance from household to nearest 
road (in minutes walking)  38.81 39.43 1.00  180.00  - 
  Community  Community participation (1 = yes)  0.94 -  0.00  1.00  + 
  Idir**  Idir  membership (1 = yes)  0.10 -  0.00  1.00  + 
*  1 timad = 0.25 hectare. 
** Idir is the traditional form of social organization (mutual cooperation). 
Attitude towards risk is a variable that measures farmers’ willingness to take risks and is 
a potentially important determinant on the decision to use soil conservation practices. Risk 
aversion can have important implications for the adoption of technologies and the farmers’ 
production-consumption plans. Various studies have shown that farmers plan their investment 
under risk (Binswanger 1980; Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009). The use of soil conservation, on the 
other hand, entails subjective risk (uncertainty of yield), particularly in the short term. In the 
longer term, the determining factor is whether soil conservation itself increases or reduced 
production risk.  
Time preference is a variable that measures the extent to which a household is likely to 
postpone current consumption for future income or the extent to which households discount 
future benefits for current consumption. High subjective discount rates may be associated with 
extreme poverty, when immediate subsistence is uncertain. More fundamentally, a high discount 
rate decreases the net present value of future benefits from soil conservation. Thus, there is an 
expected inverse relationship between farmers’ discount rate and a decision to invest in soil 
conservation. 
An expected change of land holdings is used as proxy for land tenure insecurity. It 
represents a variable that indexes a household’s attitude toward change in land size. Farmers may 
be insecure (perception of insecurity) about their current farms due to frequent redistribution of 
lands (Admassie 2000). Studies have also shown that tenure security is essential for adoption of 
soil conservation practices (Gebremedehin and Scott 2003). It is therefore expected that tenure 
insecurity (expected decline of land holdings) is negatively related to soil conservation adoption.  
As information and communication mechanisms, contact with various sources of 
information, advice from extension agents, and use of radio, are expected to positively influence Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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adoption of soil conservation practices. Use of radio and extension activities may help farmers 
better understand the potential effects of soil erosion and benefits of soil conservation, as well as 
enhance their technical capacity to apply soil conservation technologies. The influence of off-
farm work is indeterminate a priori. Income generated from off-farm work is expected to have a 
positive influence if it helps buffer the short-term variations in output due to soil conservation 
practices. In this case, the implication is that farmers with off-farm incomes are better risk takers, 
vis-à-vis using soil-conservation practices, than those without off-farm income. On the other 
hand, off-farm income may have a negative influence, if a farmer’s off-farm employment 
opportunities cause labor shortages (from competition between agriculture and off-farm 
activities) that restrict the farmer’s ability to build soil conservation structures.  
The regional characteristics that we focused on were market access and social 
interactions in the community. Distance from the home to the nearest all-weather road was a 
proxy for market access (transport cost). Nearest roads were associated with low farm-input costs 
and high farm-output prices, as well as greater opportunities for income-earning activities, 
primarily sale of farm produce. Market access offers incentives for farmers to improve or 
maintain their land quality and thus a positive effect is expected. Farmers who have the 
advantage of good market access (including demand for high-value crops) may find adopting soil 
conservation practices very attractive economically. Existence of good road networks also 
facilitates the availability of and exposure to information and communication, leading to a 
positive influence on adoption of soil conservation practices. We included a district dummy (1 
for Basona-Werena and zero for Ankober) in the model to control for village differences in 
knowledge, farming traditions, and physical characteristics, for example.    
Social capital is characterized by norms, interactions, and reciprocity, leading to 
cooperation and information flows. It consists of discrete platforms organized and run by 
members of communities or groups for various purposes, notably to enhance confidence, pool 
resources, encourage savings, and extend credit. In addition to specialized functions, these 
networks act as forums for the exchange of experience and information about market behavior, 
the movement of goods and prices, development needs and priorities, among others. Hence, they 
can be used to promote development endeavors.  
Two variables are proxies for social capital in this study. One, community participation, 
means the household is engaged in soil conservation activities organized by the farmers’ 
association. In most cases, the farmers’ association organizes campaigns to reclaim and preserve 
the communal lands in the area. It is thus expected that the spillover effect of this variable on 
household adoption of soil conservation will be positive. Studies have indicated that where Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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public soil conservation activities take place in the same community, but not on the household’s 
own land, farmers will be more likely to adopt soil conservation due to the experience effect of 
reducing real conservation investment costs and awareness of the effectiveness of conservation 
(Gebremedhin and Scott 2003).  
The second variable for social capital uses membership in idir, the traditional form of 
social organization. In smallholder agriculture, the problem of labor shortage might be solved, 
for example, through idir—a form of mutual cooperation imbued with a team spirit. In idir, 
information flows among members and they have labor-sharing arrangements. The effect of idir 
on adoption of soil conservation is indeterminate a priori. If the members enter an agreement to 
share labor for conservation activities, idir will positively affect the decision to use soil 
conservation; otherwise, other social activities will deter adoption of soil conservation practice. 
5.3  Regression Results 
The chi-square test statistic for the estimated multinomial logit model is 276.95, with 52 
degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis that the nonintercept coefficients are jointly zero is 
rejected at the 0.01 probability level. This means that the empirical MNL is highly significant in 
explaining the choice of soil conservation practice by farmers. We used the Huber-White-
Sandwich estimator of variances, instead of the conventional maximum likelihood variance 
estimator, in order to avoid the problem of heteroskedasticity. In the analysis of plot-level data, 
correlated observations may occur due to repeated measurements of the same subjects. 
Clustering the data allows repeated observations, which are not independent within groups, 
although they must be independent across groups, so that standard errors can be adjusted for 
clustering within farm households to allow for correlation within the group. The predictive 
power of the model is quite appealing. The choice of none, stone terraces, or soil bunds is 
correctly predicted for 81 percent, 60 percent, and 53 percent of the sample, respectively. These 
results are also an indication that we have correctly classified soil conservation technologies for 
our analysis. Although there is some variation in the labor input and efficacy of other 
technologies applied, overall they are more similar to the “no” category than the soil and stone 
bunds.  
As we hypothesized, the farmer’s decision to build stone terraces is significantly affected 
by extension services, sex of the household head, expected declines in land holdings, risk 
aversion, discount rate, number of plots, tenure arrangement (if owner operated), slope of the 
plot (medium steepness), use of the plot (for cropping), community participation, and the district 
dummy. On the other hand, choosing soil bunds significantly depends on the sex of the Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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household head, age of the household head, family labor force, participation in off-farm work, 
trend of land holdings (expected declines in land holdings), plot size, tenure arrangement (if plot 
is operated by the owner), soil type, steepness of the plot, use of the plot (for cropping), and the 
district dummy. Estimated changes in probabilities for the variables used in the regression are 
presented in table 4.  
Table 4. Marginal Effects on Probability of Choice of Soil Conservation 
Variables      None      Stone terracing      Soil bunds 
Household characteristics 
 Sex  -0.116 (0.051)** 0.084 (0.049)* 0.032 (0.011)
 Age  0.007 (0.000) 0.002 (0.009) -0.008 (0.003)**
 Age-squared  -0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001)
 Literacy   -0.022 (0.047) 0.013 (0.042) 0.009 (0.014)
 Labor force  0.011 (0.019) -0.025 (0.017) 0.013 (0.007)**
 Extension  -0.062 (0.054) 0.079 (0.049)** -0.018 (0.016)
 Radio  -0.024 (0.076) -0.014 (0.058) 0.037 (0.041)
 Off-farm  -0.105 (0.064)* 0.069 (0.055)* 0.035 (0.021)**
 Oxen ownership   -0.039 (0.052) 0.048 (0.042)** -0.009 (0.016)
 Income  0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001)
 Land holding trends  0.179 (0.080)** -0.118 (0.070)** -0.062 (0.032)**
 Risk preference  0.029 (0.017)* -0.029 (0.015)** -0.0001 (0.004)
 Time preference  0.002 (0.001)** -0.002 (0.001)** -0.0002 (0.0003)
Plot characteristics 
 Parcel  0.019 (0.011)** -0.023 (0.010)*** 0.003 (0.003)
 Plot size  -0.049 (0.027)* 0.031 (0.024) 0.019 (0.009)*
 Tenure  -0.120 (0.040)*** 0.092 (0.038)* 0.028 (0.012)**
 Highly fertile soil  -0.047 (0.061) 0.021 (0.053) 0.024 (0.018)
 Medium fertile soil  -0.009 (0.042) -0.013 (0.037) 0.024 (0.018)
 Soil type  -0.002 (0.038) 0.040 (0.032) -0.038 (0.015)***
 Gentle slope  -0.178 (0.064)*** 0.163 (0.061)*** 0.016 (0.018)
 Steep slope  -0.208 (0.060)*** 0.164 (0.056)*** 0.044 (0.020)**
 Plot distance  0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
 Plot use  -0.286 (0.044)*** 0.241 (0.038)*** 0.045 (0.016)***Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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Regional characteristics 
 Road distance  -0.007 (0.017) 0.013 (0.016) -0.007 (0.005)
 Community  -0.163 (0.037)** 0.152 (0.029)** 0.011 (0.020)
 Idir  -0.056 (0.105) 0.056 (0.095) 0.001 (0.032)
 District  0.369 (0.086)*** -0.201 (0.069)*** -0.168 (0.056)***
*, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
Note:  Figures in parentheses are standard error. 
The farmer’s attitude towards risk has a negative effect on the choice of stone terraces or 
soil bunds. Because conservation practices are affected by several random variables that result in 
uncertainty in yields, planning for soil conservation involves decisionmaking under risk. The 
farmer’s risk preference is thus related to such decisionmaking scenarios. The highly significant 
marginal effect coefficient on “none” indicates that the farmer’s risk aversion increases the 
likelihood of non-adoption of soil conservation practices. The risk-averse farmers who do not 
invest in soil conservation may assume uncertain yield variations, increasing the probability of 
no soil conservation by about 3 percentage points. The result of the marginal effect again implies 
that a 1 percent increase in farmers’ risk aversion would significantly (p < 0.05) decrease the 
probability of choosing stone terraces by 3 percentage points.  
Farmers’ risk-aversion behavior has the same negative effect on choice of soil bunds, but 
is statistically not significant. One reason for the significant negative effect of farmers’ risk 
preference for stone terraces over soil bunds may be that construction of stone terraces requires 
more labor and a longer time to produce the expected higher return in yield than soil bunds. As a 
result, the more risk-averse farmers may be less interested in investing in stone terraces than soil 
bunds. Figure 1 below depicts the change in predicted probabilities of household decisions about 
soil conservation (none, stone terraces, or soil bunds) due to changes in risk-aversion behavior. 
The figure clearly shows that as risk aversion increases the probability of adoption of stone 
terraces continuously declines, no conservation increases, and use of soil bunds remains 
unchanged. 
As expected, the farmers’ time preference influences patterns of resource use in the 
current and future period. Farmers who have a higher discount rate are less inclined to long-term 
investments, giving more weight to the current, rather than the future, period. Our result 
confirmed the hypothesized relationship:  the farmers’ intertemporal discount rate negatively 
affects the decision to adopt soil conservation practices. A higher rate of time preference leads to 
the significantly higher (p < 0.05) likelihood of nonadoption of soil conservation. The marginal Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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effect of nonadoption of soil conservation, due to a unit percentage change in the farmers’ inter-
temporal discount rate, is about 0.2 percentage points. Even though the farmers’ time preference 
negatively affects the use of both stone terraces and soil bunds, its effect is statistically different 
from zero  (p < 0.05) on likelihood of adoption of stone terraces only. The result of the marginal 
effect indicates that a unit percentage increase in the farmers’ inter-temporal discount rate will 
decrease the probability of choosing stone terrace by about 0.2 percentage points. The two 
choices have different effects probably because (compared to soil bunds) farmers consider stone 
terraces to be more labor intensive. Their longer investment (time and labor) discourages the 
farmers’ willingness to delay current consumption for future income. 
















The farmers’ expectation that they will lose some of their land holdings significantly 
reduces the likelihood of choosing either stone terraces and soil bunds to a 10 percent and 5 
percent significance level, respectively. Farmers may be very cautious, given their tenure 
insecurity arising from land redistribution that may occur in response to growing population size 
and new membership in farmers’ associations. The result of the marginal effect indicates that 
tenure insecurity significantly increases the likelihood of non-adoption of soil conservation by Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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about 18 percentage points. Alternatively stated, this result implies that when farmers’ security 
of land is not guaranteed (when farmers expect their land holdings to decline), the probability of 
using stone terraces or soil bunds is significantly reduced by 12 and 6 percentage points, 
respectively. This suggests that securing the tenure of a household’s holding(s) should be an 
alternative policy option to encourage investments in soil conservation.  
Access to extension services is another important variable, indicating that farmers can get 
information about better farming practices and enhance their understanding and technical 
capability for soil-conservation practices. The result of the marginal effect analysis indicates that 
access to extension services increases the probability of adopting stone terraces by about 8 
percentage points. The effect of this variable on the choice of soil bunds is negative, although 
statistically insignificant. It also suggests that the marginal effect of age on the likelihood of 
choosing soil bunds is negative and statistically different from zero at the 5 percent significance 
level. 
 The probability of adopting soil bunds increases more for young farmers than old ones. 
The implication is that older household heads probably have shorter planning horizons and are 
physically weaker, more resistant to change, and hence less interested in adopting soil 
conservation practices, which have long-term effects. Thus, targeting young farmers for soil 
conservation intervention is probably an advisable strategy because they tend to be quicker and 
more flexible in deciding to adopt new ideas and technologies. With a longer life span—because 
these farmers are younger—they would anticipate a longer payout period for their investment.  
Families are an important source of labor for farm operations and construction of soil 
conservation structures. This variable has a positive and statistically significant (p < 0.05) effect 
on the likelihood of adoption of soil bunds. The result of the marginal effect suggests that a unit 
increase in family labor size positively changes the adoption of soil bunds by about 1 percentage 
point. Its effect on the choice of stone terraces is negative and statistically insignificant. The 
marginal effect of off-farm work on the adoption of soil bunds is positive and statistically 
different from zero at the 10 percent significance level, implying that the income obtained from 
off-farm work relaxes the liquidity constraints in conservation adoption. Participation in off-farm 
work increases the likelihood of adoption as evidenced by the negative and statistically 
significant marginal effect on the non-use of conservation practices.  
As hypothesized, the number of plots (fragmentation of farms) has a negative effect on 
adoption of soil conservation, indicated by the highly significant marginal effect on “none.” One 
possible explanation is that with more plots farmers may face increased transaction costs in Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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constructing the conservation structures. Stone terraces, particularly, require the cumbersome 
activity of transporting stones to the different plots. This may significantly deter the adoption of 
stone terraces. However, the effect of the number of plots on the choice of soil bunds is positive, 
but insignificant. The size of the fragmented plot area also positively influences the adoption of 
soil conservation practices. The significant marginal effect on “none” indicates that decreasing 
plot area increases the probability of non-adoption of soil conservation practices on a plot. This 
is probably because farmers may be constrained in building conservation structures because 
stone terraces and soil bunds are not suitable or convenient for a small plot. In addition, farmers 
assume that conservation structures take up space on a small plot and reduce the net cropping 
area. Unwillingness to invest on small plots could also be considered as an issue of economies of 
scale. 
There is a significant difference between the two districts in terms of adopting soil 
conservation practices. Compared to Basona-Werena, farmers in Ankober have an increased 
likelihood of constructing stone terraces and soil bunds by about 20 and 10 percentage points, 
respectively. The adoption rate of soil conservation practice in Ankober is relatively higher (53 
percent) than in Basona-Werena (44 percent). In Ankober, soil conservation and soil fertility 
maintenance dates back more than half a century. Personal communication and discussions with 
elderly people and experts from the local agricultural office revealed that construction of soil 
conservation structures is indigenous to the area with no government intervention so far. 
However, soil conservation in Basona-Werena only appeared some thirty years ago with massive 
government intervention. The longer and indigenous tradition of soil conservation in Ankober 
may be one reason for the relatively higher rate of adoption there. In addition, the topography of 
Ankober may also help promote soil conservation in the area. According to information from the 
district office of agriculture, the topography of both districts is mountainous, rugged, and plain 
landscape, respectively, covering 75 percent, 15 percent, and 10 percent of Ankober, and 50 
percent, 27 percent, and 23 percent of Basona-Werena. 
6.  Conclusions and Implications 
This study uses survey data of smallholder farmers in the central highlands of Ethiopia to 
analyze the determinants of their choice of soil conservation practices. The study also endeavors 
to elicit farmers’ attitudes toward risk preference using an experimental method. A link between 
risk aversion and resource protection in the form of soil conservation practice was found in this 
study. Results from the experimental method indicate that the estimated risk aversion is high and 
the majority of the farmers were found to have intermediate, severe, or extreme risk aversion. Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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Empirical results from the multinomial logit analysis demonstrate that a high degree of risk 
aversion has a negative effect on adoption of labor intensive soil conservation practices. 
Farmer’s risk aversion increases the likelihood of nonadoption of stone terraces and soil bund 
practices   
One implication of this work is that it is important to target the underlying reasons for 
nonadoption, such as high degrees of risk aversion and high subjective discount rates. Promotion 
of a longer-term and more effective soil conservation system (e.g., stone terraces) cannot only be 
accomplished through extension and programs targeting physical interventions, as indicated by 
the results from Basona-Werena, where such activities have been common. Farmers in the study 
areas are poor with high estimated discount rates and levels of risk aversion. Because they are 
trapped in poverty, their high discount rates and risk preferences mean that they are still inclined 
to use erosion-prone practices to meet their present, urgent needs. The results imply that, to 
promote soil conservation, policies that reduce farmers’ risk behavior should have priority, 
especially those that address land tenure security and rights, access to better education and 
extension services, and development of income-generating off-farm activities. 
The results of this study are limited to the soil-conservation adoption decision. Because 
the observation is only whether a farmer uses a given practice or not, the study can only predict 
the effect of farmers’ risk preferences and other factors on the probability that they will adopt a 
particular soil-conservation practice. The use of most of these soil conservation practices is 
considered to be a continuous investment, however. Moreover, the conservation effects of using 
soil-conserving practices are likely to vary according to the intensity to which they are used. 
Hence, it would also be important to study the extent to which such practices are used and what 
factors might influence the intensity of soil conservation practices.  Environment for Development  Teklewold and Köhlin 
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